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follow-up Commission. To this day a series 
of land disputes has yet to be resolved. 
The disputes and social struggle over land in 
post-conflict Liberia are not only about land 
per se but about authority and legitimacy 
more generally. Returnees base their claims 
to land and property on pre-war ownership 
and a right to return to the way things ‘used 
to be’ prior to the war. The ex-combatant 
squatters ground their claims in their physical 
presence and de facto occupation of the 
land, threats of violence and moral claims 
to the land as a ‘reward’ for heroism and 
for defending it during the war. As things 
stand now, the return of refugees and IDPs 
and the reintegration of ex-combatants 
appear to be mutually exclusive processes. 
The result is a profound reshaping of social, 
political and economic relations between 
local populations and a delay in  processes 
of genuine reconciliation. The international 
community has to date sought to stabilise 
the Liberian state centrally in Monrovia, 
only timidly addressing issues of, land 
access and political power at the local level. 
Advice for external agencies 
The findings above indicate a need for 
the international community to:
■■ take note of local political and economic 
contexts when intervening to assist IDPs 
and refugees in fragile states
■■ translate and adapt international standards 
and norms, such as the ones prescribed 
for the reintegration of ex-combatants and 
forced migrants, to the particular contexts 
of emerging local political orders in fragile 
states to secure real effects on the ground
■■ base reintegration programmes – for ex-
combatants and forced migrants alike – on 
evidence-based research on the actual 
political and economic situation in the 
aftermath of war in fragile states. 
Jairo Munive jari@diis.dk is postdoctoral 
researcher in the Peace, Risk and Violence unit  
at the Danish Institute for International Studies. 
www.diis.dk/sw152.asp
Peace villages for repatriates to Burundi
Jean-Benoît Falisse and René Claude Niyonkuru
Burundi’s peace villages, which are intended both as models for reintegration and as centres 
of economic development, have encountered a number of problems which are related to the 
country’s continued fragility as a state. 
Specially constructed villages have been built 
in Burundi since 2005 to welcome landless 
and ‘rootless’ repatriates returning from 
exile in Tanzania. Some had been refugees 
since 1972 and others since 1993. Although 
most refugees were able to return to their 
own land, some of them had nowhere to 
go. Some of the ‘1972 Hutu repatriates’ 
had scarcely any remaining ties with their 
country of origin and no knowledge of 
their or their parents’ land in Burundi. 
Eventually this prompted the idea of building 
villages to house those who had resorted to 
occupying the offices of the administrative 
authorities, demanding a solution to their 
plight. Twa (the third official ethnic group in 
Burundi) with no land, internally displaced 
Tutsi and other categories of vulnerable 
people were also invited to move into the 
villages with the aim of reviving social 
diversity. This earned them the title of ‘peace 
villages’. With the continuing influx of 
refugees, there was an increasingly urgent 
need to find a permanent solution for the 
repatriates. UNHCR therefore cooperated 
with the government to create a first 
generation of 19 villages across the country 
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between 2004 and 2007, despite the fact that 
the concept of a village is broadly unfamiliar 
in the Burundian landscape, where homes 
are generally scattered over the hillsides. 
An assessment of the first generation of 
peace villages suggests that not only are the 
buildings deteriorating but also the villages 
were failing to provide any way for their 
inhabitants to reintegrate into the local socio-
economic environment. It was then decided 
to construct a second generation of villages, 
no longer simply to provide accommodation 
but also water and decent sanitary conditions 
as well as means of subsistence, land suitable 
for cultivation, and income-generating 
activities for the inhabitants. Eight new 
villages known as Integrated Rural Peace 
Villages were built in the country’s southern 
provinces between 2007 and 2010. 
Five or even, in some cases, ten years after the 
peace villages were built, their success can 
be seen as at best partial. Reintegration is a 
geographical rather than a social reality and 
the risk is that, in many places, the inhabitants 
of the villages will be seen as second-class 
citizens for at least another generation. 
None of the villages seems to have driven 
reintegration to the extent that was promised. 
Many villages are still dependent on food 
aid from the World Food Programme or the 
Ministry of National Solidarity, and economic 
activity appears to have started in scarcely 
any of the villages. In practice, the villages 
are not economically viable entities, they are 
prey to property speculation and there are 
tensions emerging with local communities. 
Villages in areas of poor fertility are struggling 
to attract repatriates, who prefer to remain in 
UNHCR’s temporary accommodation centres. 
The vicious circle of fragility?    
Whilst villagisation policies in the east and 
central African region are memorable for the 
fact that they often involved coercion (as in 
Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and in 
the 1990s in Burundi itself), these villages 
are, technically, home only to those who live 
there voluntarily. Their ‘voluntary’ nature 
remains questionable, however, given the 
situation in which people found themselves 
before moving to a village, a move often 
made on the promise of a decent life. 
The Burundian Peace Villages built between 
2004 and 2010 are also marked by their 
twofold objective of being not only places of 
reintegration but also, in the official rhetoric, 
examples of development in one of the most 
rural countries in the world. The housing 
scattered across Burundi’s hillsides is seen 
as unconducive to the country’s economic 
development, insofar as it is easier to provide 
basic social services to a more densely 
concentrated population. The rhetoric is, in 
fact, quite similar to that used in the ujamaa 
villagisation programme in Tanzania and 
the imidugudu programme in Rwanda. 
Fundamentally, the peace villages 
reintegration project is therefore incredibly 
ambitious. To succeed in the long term, 
it effectively requires the state (and not 
international aid) to be able to provide its 
inhabitants with an adequate level of basic 
social services and a degree of security – 
precisely two of the characteristics whose 
absence defines a fragile country. 
While security in the villages is not always 
as good as it could be, it is less of a problem 
than the lack of basic social services tailored 
to the specific needs of the inhabitants of 
the villages. A typical example is primary 
education. As a result of their time in 
Tanzania, most of the children in the villages 
have learned Swahili rather than Kirundi, 
which is the national language of Burundi and 
the language of primary education. Unless 
they have the good fortune to benefit from 
one of the projects organised by international 
aid organisations to provide educational 
support, children in the villages therefore 
have little chance of succeeding in the 
Burundian education system. On the other 
hand, the state is not in a position to provide 
the same standard of basic social services for 
the surrounding areas as it is providing in the 
villages – as is sometimes the case for water – 
and this results in community disputes, which 
can go as far as the sabotage of infrastructure.
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The state’s lack of legitimacy can also be seen 
in the peace villages in the limited capacity 
of local institutions to maintain peaceful 
community relations. Repatriates do, however, 
represent a source of development potential. 
Most of them, for example, speak Swahili 
and have some knowledge of English, which 
are important assets for a country that has 
joined the East African Community despite 
not sharing the region’s two linguae francae.
One cause of the fundamental fragility of 
Burundi and other countries in the region 
is land. The villages – because they take 
up land and make land available to their 
inhabitants for subsistence farming – add 
a further layer of problems in a situation 
where there is a limited number of conflict 
resolution mechanisms. Seventy per cent of 
the disputes brought before the local courts 
in Burundi concern land and the average size 
of plots has been reduced over successive 
generations to 0.3 hectare. Up to 18% of 
the country’s land is thought to be subject 
to dispute. In spite of its recent efforts, the 
state itself struggles to clarify the status of 
numerous areas of land. At a local level, the 
authorities are routinely overwhelmed. 
If the fragility of the state is a significant 
obstacle to the success of reintegration 
through the peace villages, the villages 
themselves also bring with them the risk 
of perpetuating that very fragility. They 
threaten to delegitimise the state, which 
seems incapable of managing the situation. 
At the same time, while the villages continue 
to be places where second-class citizens 
dependent on humanitarian assistance live, 
they represent a source of frustration. The 
situation seems impossible to resolve, given 
that the village ‘solution’ brings its own 
problems, creating a vicious cycle of fragility. 
The villages are a thorny issue and it is too 
easy simply to dismiss outright all the efforts 
that have been made to date. The reintegration 
of over 5,000 rootless families who arrived 
almost in one go is a major challenge for any 
country, and all the more so for Burundi, a 
fragile nation that is only 
just recovering from a 
bloody civil war. A case-
by-case approach, based 
on reintegration family-
by-family, hillside-
by-hillside, would 
seem less problematic 
but is a monumental 
task – even more so 
as another 35,200 
Burundian citizens 
returned at the end of 
2012 when Mtabila camp 
in Tanzania was closed. 
The mistake made with 
the villages as a solution 
for reintegration was 
perhaps a question 
of trying to think too 
big too quickly and of 
putting the cart before 
the horse. History seems 
to suggest that towns 
and villages do not drive 
economic development; 
Peace village at Nkurye, South Burundi, in November 2010.
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Fragile states and protection under the 1969 African 
Refugee Convention 
Tamara Wood
Current practice in African states highlights both the potential and the limitations of the 1969 
African Refugee Convention in providing protection to persons displaced from fragile states.
In the most recent Failed States Index, 16 of 
the 20 most fragile states in the world are 
in Africa.1 States such as Somalia, Sudan, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Zimbabwe consistently top the list. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, these states are also major 
sources of refugee flows on the African 
continent. The protracted civil war in 
Somalia, for example, has resulted in the 
displacement of over a million people across 
international borders, to neighbouring Kenya 
and further afield. In South Africa, over half 
of the more than 100,000 asylum applications 
received each year are from Zimbabwe.  
The legal status of individuals displaced 
from fragile states is often ambiguous. 
Those who can establish a “well-founded 
fear of persecution” for one of five reasons 
(race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political 
opinion) will be entitled to protection 
under the international 1951 Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees 
(1951 Convention). However, individuals 
fleeing the many other symptoms of state 
fragility, including poor governance, 
widespread insecurity, poverty and lack of 
basic services, will often fall outside the 1951 
Convention as they are unable to establish 
either an individual risk of persecution 
or the requisite link between the risk and 
one of the five Convention reasons.
In Africa, this gap in the protection of the 1951 
Convention might be expected to be filled by 
its regional counterpart, the 1969 Organisation 
of African Unity Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
(1969 Convention), which expands refugee 
protection to cover persons who are compelled 
to leave their homes “owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination 
or events seriously disturbing public order”.2 
The breadth of situations covered by the 1969 
Convention has led to extensive praise for 
the Convention and it is generally thought 
to provide legal protection to persons fleeing 
the very kinds of widespread, generalised 
and indiscriminate forms of harm that 
typically characterise conditions in fragile 
states. What is less well known is the 
effect that the 1969 Convention has had on 
African refugee protection in practice.
Protection for persons fleeing fragile states
Experience in refugee-hosting states such as 
South Africa, Kenya and Uganda suggests 
rather it is economic development that drives 
the creation of towns and villages. 
Building the capacity of the state – which is 
a necessary part of lifting the country out of 
its fragility – requires the trust of its citizens 
but unfortunately the peace villages story as 
it has been unfolding for about ten years now 
continues to illustrate the system’s inability to 
win their trust and thus emerge from fragility. 
We do not have a miraculous solution for the 
villages except the hope that economic activity 
eventually picks up and manages to transform 
the villages that are currently kept alive by aid 
into stable and sustainable communities where 
fundamental human rights are respected.
Jean-Benoît Falisse is a doctoral researcher  
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jean-benoit.falisse@qeh.ox.ac.uk 
René Claude Niyonkuru rcniyo@yahoo.com is a 
researcher on land policy and a Masters Student 
at the Institute of Development Policy and 
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